Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Matthew Stewart and E Margolis/S Laurence
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
20 ideas
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
|
11121
|
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
|
11120
|
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
|
11122
|
A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11124
|
Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
|
11123
|
Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11125
|
The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
|
11140
|
Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
|
11128
|
Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11129
|
The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11130
|
Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11131
|
It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
|
11134
|
People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11136
|
Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11133
|
Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11135
|
Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11132
|
The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
|
11137
|
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
|
|
11138
|
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
|
11139
|
Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
|
11146
|
People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence]
|